Radicalization and Extremism Protocol

The Willows Primary School

Explore - Dream - Discover

Contents

Scope

To reduce the risk from terrorism we need not only to stop terrorist attacks but also to prevent people becoming terrorists. The radicalisation of European Muslims is now a focal point at which efforts to safeguard vulnerable individuals is aimed to halt Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorism in Europe.

All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. The response to this threat is the governments *Prevent* strategy. The aim of *Prevent* is to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists, by challenging the spread of terrorist ideology, supporting vulnerable individuals, and working in key sectors and institutions.

Work to safeguard children and adults, providing early intervention to protect and divert people away from being drawn into terrorist activity, is at the heart of the revised *Prevent* strategy. Supporting vulnerable individuals requires clear frameworks – including guidance on how to identify vulnerability and assess risk, where to seek support and measures to ensure that we do not ever confuse prevention and early intervention with law enforcement.

Purpose

The purpose of the *Prevent* strategy: (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/) is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. *Prevent* is one of the four main work streams of the overall UK strategy for Countering Terrorism, known as CONTEST.

Aims

This model was developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), in response to the previous Labour government's Prevent Strategy, which was launched in 2007. This strategy aimed to stop radicalisation, reduce support for terrorism and violent extremism, and discourage people from becoming terrorists. Since 2007, there have been a number of revisions to the strategy, culminating in its comprehensive review by the coalition government published in June 2011.

Radicalisation As A Process

As its definitions indicate, radicalisation is best viewed as a process of change, a personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Recent scholars argue that becoming radicalised is, for most people, a gradual process and one that requires a progression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily. So a person does not become radical overnight, although the influence of an incident which may act as a 'catalyst event' (such as an experienced act of discrimination, perceived attack on Islam such as the 2003 war on Iraq, or a 'moral crisis' with the death of a loved one) may accelerate the process. For instance, scholars suggest the majority of female suicide bombers in Iraq are thought to have had family members killed by either multi-national or state forces in the country, triggering their own recourse to terrorism, from what we assume is an act of vengeance.

Models Of The Radicalisation Process

A number of studies in the literature identified that the process of radicalisation is composed of distinct and identifiable phases, charting the transition from early involvement to becoming operationally active.

The Prevent pyramid

One way of conceiving radicalisation is as a progressive movement up a pyramidal-type model, where higher levels in the pyramid are associated with increased levels of radicalisation but decreased numbers of those involved as below.


Figure 2.1: The ACPO tiered model of intervention to address Prevent.

At the apex of the pyramid are active terrorists (Tier 4 – those actively breaking the law) who remain relatively few in number when considered in relation to all those who may sympathise with their beliefs and feelings. This larger group occupy the next level down (Tier 3 – moving towards extremism). While not committing any violent acts themselves, they may provide tacit support to those sitting at the top of the pyramid and act to inspire others from below (at Tier 2). At this lower level, there sits a far larger grouping which constitutes all those that are considered 'vulnerable' to being influenced by these messages. One such group is young people within the criminal justice system. At the very bottom of the pyramid is the 'wider community', although it is unclear from the model how broad this grouping actually is (i.e. whether 'community' functions as an anodyne synonym for 'society' or a more meaningful grouping stratified by some category of faith, such as the 'Muslim community' etc.).

From this pyramid perspective, radicalisation is the gradient distinguishing the active terrorist from the broader base of sympathisers. The model leaves open the question of how a person moves from the base to the extremes of the apex. What is assumed is an implicit and linear relationship between the process of radicalisation and ultimately, for some, participation in terrorism. This assumption acts as a cornerstone of the previous Labour government's 2007 Prevent policy. However, some scholars argue that radicalisation is more 'unpredictable and complicated' than the linear process assumed by Prevent.

The New York Police Department's four-stage radicalisation process

The New York Police Department (NYPD) produced a report which systematically examined 11 in-depth case studies of Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation and terrorism conducted in the West and identified four phases: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadisation. These stages are described as follows:-

Figure 2.2: The NYPD's proposed four-stage radicalisation process

Pre-radicalisation: this initial stage describes the person's life situation before radicalisation and prior to exposure and adoption of Jihadi-Salafi Islam ideology. Presumably, the authors are describing here an 'at risk' group displaying some vulnerability (as in the pyramidal Tier 2 discussed in the Prevent pyramid section above) although this is unclear.

Self-identification: this stage encompasses the person's early exploration of Salafi Islam, and a gradual gravitation away from their old identity, the beginning of association with like-minded individuals and adoption of this ideology as their own. A "cognitive opening" provides the catalyst for this, where religious seeking is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes an individual's certitude in previously held beliefs and leaves them receptive to new world views. The authors include a wide range of triggers that can serve as catalysts, including: economic triggers (losing a job, blocked mobility), social triggers (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived), political triggers (international conflicts involving Muslims) and personal triggers (death in the close family).

Indoctrination: this third phase sees an individual progressively intensifying their beliefs, and finally wholly adopting the Jihadi-Salafi ideology. This leads to a conviction that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause of militant Jihad. It is said that this phase is typically facilitated and driven by a "spiritual sanctioner". Important to this phase is the association with like-minded people in order to 'deepen' the indoctrination. This is similar to Tier 3 of the terrorist pyramid ("moving towards extremism"), but appears to encompass a hardened ideological position. The role of the group becomes increasingly formative in encouraging and reinforcing hardened views.

Jihadisation: this is the final operational phase in the radicalisation process, where members of the cluster accept an individual duty to participate in Jihad, "self-designating themselves as holy warriors or mujahadin". Ultimately, this sees the group carrying out a terrorist attack, including planning, preparation and execution (i.e. leading to Tier 4 – actively breaking the law).

There is no inevitability to this process, however. Not all who begin the process progress through all the stages, and they may either stop or abandon the radicalisation process at different points. However, those studied who did progress were deemed 'quite likely' to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act.

Safeguarding Responsibilities

Safeguarding and promoting the welfare of vulnerable children and adults is the responsibility of all statutory partners. It is a key requirement for local authorities, working with other partners including the police, the health sector, schools and colleges, the voluntary sector, parents and carers and the wider community to ensure that vulnerable children, young people and adults are protected from harm. All have a legal duty to work together to safeguard and promote the welfare of children and young people. Local authorities also have a lead role in coordinating work to safeguard adults.

Making a Referral (within School or to the Panel Channel)

The following principles should guide information sharing:

- Necessity and proportionality: information should only be shared where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public.
- Consent: wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them. In the absence of consent, personal information cannot be shared without satisfying one of the gateway or exemption conditions (see Annex A).
- Power to share: the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act, the Human Rights Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality. In engaging with non-public bodies it is good practice to ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act.

Channel referrals should therefore be prioritised by the local authority and other statutory partners in all their work to safeguard vulnerable individuals. Channel should be considered alongside other early intervention measures such as work undertaken to support and divert young people from anti-social behaviour, gangs or drugs.

Vulnerability Indicators To Be Considered in Making a Referral

Following a school referral the Channel Panel assesses vulnerability using a consistently applied vulnerability assessment framework built around three dimensions;

- Engagement with a group, cause or ideology
- Intent to cause harm
- Capability to cause harm

The dimensions are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (stop intending to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

The three dimensions are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, 6 that relate to intent and 3 for capability). These factors taken together form a rounded view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether an individual needs support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment.

School Referrals – Vulnerability Assessment

Completing a full assessment for all 22 factors requires thorough knowledge of the individual that may not be available at the point of the initial referral. However, there are a number of behaviours and other indicators that may indicate the presence of these factors.

Example indicators that an individual is engaged with an extremist group, cause or ideology include;

- spending increasing time in the company of other suspected extremists
- changing their style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group
- their day-to-day behaviour becoming increasingly centred around an extremist ideology, group or cause
- loss of interest in other friends and activities not associated with the extremist ideology, group or cause
- possession of material or symbols associated with an extremist cause (e.g. the swastika for far right groups)
- attempts to recruit others to the group/cause/ideology
- communications with others that suggest identification with a group/cause/ideology.

Example indicators that an individual has an intention to use violence or other illegal means include;

- clearly identifying another group as threatening what they stand for and blaming that group for all social or political ills
- using insulting or derogatory names or labels for another group
- speaking about the imminence of harm from the other group and the importance of action now
- expressing attitudes that justify offending on behalf of the group, cause or ideology
- condoning or supporting violence or harm towards others
- plotting or conspiring with others.
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 Example indicators that an individual is capable of contributing directly or indirectly to an act of terrorism include;

- having a history of violence
- being criminally versatile and using criminal networks to support extremist goals
- having occupational skills that can enable acts of terrorism (such as civil engineering, pharmacology or construction)
- having technical expertise that can be deployed (e.g. IT skills, knowledge of chemicals, military training or survival skills)

The examples above are not exhaustive and vulnerability may manifest itself in other ways. There is no single route to terrorism nor is there a simple profile of those who become involved. For this reason, any attempt to derive a 'profile' can be misleading. It must not be assumed that these characteristics and experiences will necessarily lead to individuals becoming terrorists, or that these indicators are the only source of information required to make an appropriate assessment about vulnerability.

Consent In The Course of Referral

The default should be to consider seeking the consent of the individual to share information. There will, of course, be circumstances in which seeking the consent of the individual will not be possible,

because it will prejudice delivery of the intended outcome, and there may be gateways or exemptions which permit sharing to take place without consent. If you cannot seek or obtain consent, or consent is refused, you cannot share personal information without satisfying one of the gateway or exemption conditions. Compliance with the Data Protection Act (DPA) and Human Rights Act (HRA) are significantly simplified by having the subject's consent. The Information Commissioner has indicated that consent should be informed and unambiguous, particularly in the case of sensitive personal information. If consent is sought, the individual should understand how their information will be used, and for what purpose.

Making A Referral In School

Our internal form for reporting concerns is attached in appendix i. The form is to be completed by any staff member that has a concern and emailed to jellis10@willowsprimary.com. You will be asked to take part in a discussion around any referral you make.

You will NOT be expected to attend a Channel Panel under normal circumstances should the referral be considered at panel level.

Related School Policies (to be read in conjunction with)

Child Protection
Safeguarding Guidance for New Staff, Governors and Volunteers

Radicalization and Extremism - Referral Form in the Case of Cause for Concern

Pupil Name	
Your Name	
Date	

Details of your concern – (please record the facts DO NOT interpret what is seen or heard.)

Nature of the concern:

Inappropriate content on phone		
Overheard Conversation		
Propaganda Material		
Gang Affiliation		
Inappropriate Material Held / Viewed by the Pupil		
Other		

Appendix ii

Useful Links

Key FOI Police Contacts

- ACPO TAM *Prevent* Delivery Unit
- prevent@acpo.pnn.police.uk
- 020 7084 8711
- ACPO FOI Central Referral Unit
- acpo.advice@foi.

UK Government Publications

- CONTEST.
- (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism-strategy/).

- Protecting children from radicalisation: the prevent duty
- https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-children-from-radicalisation-the-prevent-duty

- Prevent: FAQ
- http://www.preventforschools.org/?category_id=40

Telephone Numbers

- The Police non-emergency number 101
- Crime stoppers 0800 555 111
- Anti-Terrorism Hotline 0800 789 321

Data Protection

- Information Sharing – Guidance for Practitioners

- http://www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/Integratedworking/Page1/DCSF-00807-2008

- Public Sector Data Sharing Guidance on the Law.
- http://www.dca.gov.uk/foi/sharing/toolkit/lawguide.pdf

- Information Commissioners Office Guidance on Interpretation of the DPA
- http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide.aspx

- Confidentiality code of Practice link:
- http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4069253

- Caldicott Guardian Manual:
- http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_114509